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Trial Practice and Procedure

by Jason Crawford*
Matthew E. Cook**
J. Clay Fuller***
Michael A. Eddings....
and
Dustin T. Brown"'..

I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey period yielded several decisions of interest and importance
to practitioners trying cases and preparing for trial. This Article will
analyze the recent judicial developments in the law relating to evidence,
insurance, jurors and jury instructions, professional liability, service of
process, and damages, as well as other issues of import to the trial
practitioner.
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CASE LAW

A.

Evidence
During this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court clarified the
self-contradictory testimony rule of Prophecy Corp. v. CharlesRossignol,
Inc.1 In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Belcher,2 the state's high court
held, in division one of its opinion, that if a party adopts a prior unsworn
statement under oath, and that adopted statement contradicts other
sworn testimony given by that same party, the testimony that is
favorable to the party's position must be disregarded.' The court
overruled a court of appeals opinion from last year, which held that even
if a party affirms the truthfulness of a prior unsworn statement under
oath, and even if that unsworn statement contradicts other sworn
testimony given by the party, the Prophesy rule cannot be invoked.4
The holding in Belcher was dictum because the court found in division
two that plaintiff had not actually adopted, during his sworn deposition,
the allegedly contradictory unsworn statement.' The decision highlights
the need for trial practitioners to prepare their clients meticulously
before their depositions. Specifically, lawyers should (1) insist upon
receiving through written discovery any and all statements given by the
client; and (2) prepare the client only to adopt portions of prior
statements that are unconditionally true.
In Wood v. D. G. Jenkins Homes, Inc.,' the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's exclusion of other similar incident evidence.' Plaintiffs
sued defendant-builder for building a house too close to plaintiffs'
property in violation of a setback requirement and for building a cross
tie wall that encroached on plaintiffs' property. In support of their
punitive damages claim, plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence that
the builder had repeatedly violated setback requirements. The trial
court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible in the first phase of the
trial, the phase that would determine liability for compensatory and
punitive damages. The trial court further held that if the jury were to
find the builder liable for punitive damages, the other similar incident

1. 256 Ga. 27, 343 S.E.2d 680 (1986).
2. 276 Ga. 522, 579 S.E.2d 737 (2003).
3. Id. at 523-24, 579 S.E.2d at 739-40.
4. Id. at 524, 579 S.E.2d at 740; see Robison v. George, 253 Ga. App. 635, 637, 560
S.E.2d 108, 111 (2002).
5. Belcher, 276 Ga. at 524, 579 S.E.2d at 740.
6. 255 Ga. App. 572, 565 S.E.2d 886 (2002).
7. Id. at 574-75, 565 S.E.2d at 889.
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evidence would be admissible in the second phase of the trial, in which
the jury determines the amount of punitive damages.8
The court of appeals reversed, recognizing, as the point of departure,
the bedrock principle that other similar incidents are relevant to the
phase one issue of liability for punitive damages.9 The real question
became whether the probative value was substantially outweighed by
the possible prejudicial effect of the evidence.1 ° In most cases, such
evidence should be admitted.
In Yang v. Washington," the court of appeals held that a trial court
should allow a litigant to voir dire an expert witness concerning his
qualifications. 2 The court also held that if the trial court denies a
litigant the opportunity to voir dire the witness, the error
is harmless so
13
long as the litigant is allowed a full cross-examination.
In a medical malpractice case decided this survey period, Byrd v.
Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc.," 4 the court of appeals found
that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence a
hospital surgery department's service manual that both supported
plaintiff's claim that defendants violated the applicable standard of care
and contradicted defense testimony about the standard of care. i" The
court rejected the argument that the manual applied to the surgery
department generally and not to gynecologists performing gynecological
surgery who had never seen the manual.'"
B.

Insurance

The court of appeals untangled complex subrogation issues in
InternationalMaintenance Corp. v. Inland Paper Board & Packaging,
Inc.'7 In that case, the workers' compensation carrier and the employer
of the injured worker successfully intervened to protect their subrogation
interest in the employee's tort action. However, the trial court dismissed
the intervenors' claims because of a conflict of interest that became
8
apparent during the litigation.'

8. Id. at 572, 565 S.E.2d at 887.
9. Id. at 572-75, 565 S.E.2d at 887-89.
10. Id. at 573, 565 S.E.2d at 888-89.
11. 256 Ga. App. 239, 568 S.E.2d 140 (2002).
12. Id. at 242, 568 S.E.2d at 144.
13. Id. at 242-43, 568 S.E.2d at 144.
14. 258 Ga. App. 286, 574 S.E.2d 326 (2002).
15. Id. at 289-90, 574 S.E.2d at 329.
16. Id. at 288-89, 574 S.E.2d at 329.
17. Int'l Maint. Corp. v. Inland Paper Bd. & Packaging, Inc., No. A02AO105, 2002 WL
1751397 (Ga. Ct. App. June 26, 2002).
18. Id. at *1.
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The employer agreed to indemnify one of the tortfeasors that was
being sued by the employee. The workers' compensation carrier was also
the liability carrier for the employer and, by virtue of the indemnification agreement, became the ultimate liability carrier for the tortfeasor.
Therefore, when the tortfeasor moved for summary judgment, rather
than supporting the position of the injured employee (and the subrogation claims that they supposedly intervened to protect), the intervenors
urged the trial court to grant the tortfeasor's motion for summary
judgment.19
The appellate court characterized the actions of the intervenors as
"'blatantly egregious' and 'fundamentally wrong,"'20 but nonetheless
found that the trial court lacked the power to prevent such actions by
litigants.2 1 In so doing, the court of appeals cited statutory and case
authority for the proposition that a trial court lacks discretion when
ruling on an initial motion to intervene brought pursuant to the workers'
compensation subrogation statute, Official Code of Georgia ("O.C.G.A.")
section 34-9-11.1.22 The court of appeals chose not to allow the trial
court to punish an intervenor that, once allowed in the case, abuses the
legislatively granted right to intervene by using its status as a party in
the case to advance an improper agenda. 3
In division two of its opinion, the court held that when intervention is
allowed pursuant to subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1, the
court may properly allow a plaintiff to dismiss a defendant from the
lawsuit over the intervenors' objection.24 The statute and cases make
clear that after such a settlement with a tortfeasor, the dispute is
entirely between the injured employee and the intervenors." The court
noted that the ruling would have been different if the employer or
insurance company were a party pursuant to subsection (c) of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-11.1, which allows the employer and or insurer to sue the
tortfeasor directly.26 The court also suggested that the ruling might
have been different if the injured employee settled with the tortfeasor
before bringing suit.27 While the former observation comports with
authority from the Georgia Supreme Court,28 the latter point is

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (1995).
Int'l Maint. Corp., 2002 WL 1751397, at *2.
Id. at *3; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b).
Int'l Maint. Corp., 2002 WL 1751397, at *4.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(c).
Int'l Maint. Corp., 2002 WL 1751397, at *4.
See Ga. Elec. Membership v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 275 Ga. 197, 563 S.E.2d 841 (2002).
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inconsistent with the court's own analysis. If an injured employee may
settle with and dismiss a tortfeasor from a filed lawsuit, and then the
matter becomes purely one of reimbursement between the employee and
the employer or insurance carrier, why should the outcome be any
different if a lawsuit has not been filed? The court left that question for
future appellate determination.
In a straight forward yet important case for trial practitioners, Horace
Mann Insurance Corp. v. Mercer,29 the court of appeals reaffirmed the
principle that multiple uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages
"stack," even if the insurance policy expressly purports to prevent
stacking.3" The court held that when a person is the beneficiary of
multiple policies covering multiple vehicles, the coverages may be
stacked.31 Such a situation is still legally different from when an
insured is the beneficiary of one policy covering multiple vehicles-a
situation in which stacking may be prohibited.32 According to the
court, this distinction is derived from the text of Georgia's Uninsured
Motorist Statute.3
C. Jurors and Jury Instructions
This survey period, the appellate courts applied, from last year's
survey period, the supreme court's landmark holding in Kim v. Walls.'
In Kim the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals determination
that when a potential juror expresses bias against a party, the trial
court is not free to rehabilitate the juror with talismanic questioning but
must allow the challenging party a thorough opportunity to voir dire the
juror and explore the extent of the juror's bias. 5
The court of appeals applied these principles in Powell v. Amin. 6 In
Powell a prospective juror named Atkinson admitted that he was a
pharmacist who derived income from prescriptions written by defendant
doctor and that he would be reluctant to serve on the jury.3 7 The trial
court asked the juror the "'talismanic question' of whether he thought
he could base his decision solely and exclusively upon the evidence""

29. 257 Ga. App. 278, 570 S.E.2d 589 (2002).
30. Id. at 279, 570 S.E.2d at 589.
31. Id., 570 S.E.2d at 589-90.
32. Id., 570 S.E.2d at 590.
33. Id. at 280, 570 S.E.2d at 590; O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (Supp. 2003).
34. 275 Ga. 177, 563 S.E.2d 847 (2002).
35. Id. at 178, 563 S.E.2d at 849.
36. 256 Ga. App. 757, 569 S.E.2d 582 (2002).
37. Id. at 759, 569 S.E.2d at 584.
38. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 584-85 (quoting Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 179, 563 S.E.2d 847,
849 (2002)).
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and did not allow counsel to conduct "'voir dire of sufficient scope and
depth to ascertain any partiality.'"3 9 The court of appeals ruled that
the trial 40court abused its discretion by qualifying juror Atkinson in this
manner.

The court of appeals held that the trial court's qualification of
prospective juror Burch, who expressed a similar bias in favor of
defendant-doctor, was not an abuse of discretion because counsel was
offered the opportunity to conduct further voir dire but declined. 4' The
opinion makes clear that the key is the opportunity for a thorough and
sifting voir dire of the potential juror. Courts should afford counsel
the opportunity to flesh out fully the juror's biases. Counsel who want
to preserve the issue on appeal must request that opportunity.
This survey period, in Zwiren v. Thompson,4 3 the supreme court
answered the question whether, in a malpractice case, an expert's
opinion on proximate cause must be expressed to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty or, instead, to a reasonable degree of medical
The supreme court held that either statement is
probability."
acceptable.45 In an attempt to remedy the confusion that has plagued
jury charges on this subject for years, the court authored its own
charge.4 6 Juries should now be instructed that the determination of
on reasonable medical probability or
proximate cause "must be based
47
reasonable medical certainty."
In another case involving a controversial jury charge, Beach v.
Lipham,48 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's use of a charge
that medical providers are presumed to have acted in an ordinarily
skillful manner. 49 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the
charge implies that plaintiff must prove his case by something more
than a preponderance of the evidence.5" The court acknowledged in
dictum that "the pattern charge may be confusing to jurors because they
are not told how much weight to give the presumption or how much

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (quoting Kim, 275 Ga. at 179, 563 S.E.2d at 849).
Id., 569 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 759-60, 569 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 760, 569 S.E.2d at 585-86.
276 Ga. 498, 578 S.E.2d 862 (2003).
Id. at 499-501, 578 S.E.2d at 864-66.
Id.
Id. at 503-04, 578 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 504, 578 S.E.2d at 867.
276 Ga. 302, 578 S.E.2d 402 (2003).
Id. at 302, 578 S.E.2d at 404.
Id. at 305, 578 S.E.2d at 406.
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rebuttal evidence is required [to overcome the presumption]."5 1
However, rather than authoring a suggested new charge, the court
merely called for a new pattern charge to be written. 2 In the meantime, beleaguered trial courts must decide whether to give a confusing
charge and be sustained on appeal or attempt to draft a better, less
confusing charge and risk reversal.
D. ProfessionalLiability
While it is clear that an expert affidavit must be filed, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1, 53 when professional malpractice is alleged,

the determination of what constitutes professional malpractice and, thus,
what triggers the affidavit requirement, can at times bewilder the trial
practitioner.
In Pomerantz v. Atlanta Dermatology & Surgery, PA., ' Mr. Pomerantz visited the doctor's office to have "stitches removed following an
earlier mole biopsy."" During the procedure, Pomerantz lost consciousness and fell onto the floor from his seated position on the examination
table. The decision turned on whether the failure to provide the patient
with support during the procedure constituted ordinary or professional
negligence. 56 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the action for failure to file an expert affidavit, noting that there was
"no allegation that it was apparent that Pomerantz might lose consciousness or that he warned anyone that he might."5 7 Without any indication or warning by Pomerantz that he might lose consciousness, the
decision to seat Pomerantz on the table during the procedure without
any support was "a matter of professional judgment [and an expert
affidavit was required] because a lay person is not expected to know
when such a procedure could cause a patient to lose consciousness. " "
The lesson for trial practitioners: when in doubt as to whether certain
acts constitute ordinary or professional negligence, one should err on the
side of caution by filing an expert affidavit.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1997).
54. 255 Ga. App. 698, 566 S.E.2d 425 (2002).
55. Id. at 698, 566 S.E.2d at 425.
56. Id. at 699, 566 S.E.2d at 426.
57. Id. at 698, 566 S.E.2d at 426.
58. Id. at 699, 566 S.E.2d at 426; see also Crisp Reg'l Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
Johnson, 258 Ga. App. 540, 542, 574 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2002) (stating that whether use
wheelchair or other precautions were proper to prevent fall of patient was a matter
professional judgment even though patient told nurse that she did not feel well prior
fall).

v.
of
of
to
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The termination of the physician-patient relationship was addressed
by the court of appeals in Grant v. Douglas Women's Clinic, PC.5 9
Because of her high risk pregnancy, Mrs. Grant was hospitalized from
May 8, 1996, through July 19, 1996. From May 8, 1996, through June
10, 1996, Dr. Potter provided treatment to Mrs. Grant.6 ° "On June 10,
the last time Dr. Potter examined Mrs. Grant, he wrote on her chart:
'Nothing to add-Looks good [signed] Potter."''
From that date until
the time of her dismissal from the hospital, Dr. Potter had no further
contact with Mrs. Grant, but he was informally consulted by the doctor
who discharged Mrs. Grant from the hospital on July 19. A week after
Mrs. Grant was released from the hospital, she went into premature
62
labor and lost her newborn child as a result of an infection.
When Mrs. Grant subsequently brought an action against Dr. Potter
alleging "negligence in discharging Mrs. Grant from the hospital when
she and her child were at risk of infection,"63 the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Potter on the grounds that he had
withdrawn from treating Mrs. Grant.' Because the physician-patient
relationship no longer existed, Dr. Potter owed no legal duty to Mrs.
Grant.65 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "a jury issue
remains as to whether Dr. Potter provided reasonable notice of his intent
to withdraw from Mrs. Grant's treatment."6" The mere chart notation
that Dr. Potter had "'[n]othing to add"'67 did not, as a matter of law,
constitute reasonable notice of his withdrawal.6" The court of appeals
also noted that the jury would be authorized to consider whether the
physician-patient relationship ended by "(1) mutual consent; (2) the
patient's dismissal of the physician; or (3) the cessation of the need for
the relationship."69
In Pilzer v. Virginia Life Insurance Reciprocal,7 ° the court of appeals
reaffirmed the principle that, in medical malpractice actions, contribution claims against joint tortfeasors must be brought within five years
of the date that the negligent act or omission occurred, as required by

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

260 Ga. App. 676, 580 S.E.2d 532 (2003).
Id. at 677, 580 S.E.2d at 533.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 677-78, 580 S.E.2d at 533-34.
Id.
Id. at 678, 580 S.E.2d at 533.
Id. at 679, 580 S.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 678, 580 S.E.2d at 534.
Id.
Id. at 679, 580 S.E.2d at 534.
260 Ga. App. 736, 580 S.E.2d 599 (2003).
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the statute of repose, O.C.G.A. section 9-3-71(b). 7 ' Because liability for
contribution necessarily depends on whether joint tortfeasors were
negligent in their professional capacity, the twenty-year statute of
limitation on contribution actions of O.C.G.A. section 9-3-22 is trumped
by the statute of repose governing medical malpractice actions. 7' The
court noted that to hold otherwise would defeat the purposes of the
statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.73
As discussed in detail in last year's survey article,74 the supreme
court in Young v. Williams 7' held that if the continuing treatment
doctrine is to be adopted in Georgia, the legislature must amend the
statute.76 The courts are constrained from creating the doctrine by
judicial interpretation of the current statute. 7 In Williams v. Devell
R. Young, M.D., PC.,78 the court of appeals dismissed the action and
made this plea to the legislature:
In light of the inequities inherent in cases like this one, in which a
patient remains under the care of one physician and the statute of
limitation expires on her claim, we encourage the General Assembly to
look into and remedy this situation by enacting a statute allowing the
incorporation of the continuous treatment doctrine into the existing
statute of limitation provided for in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71. A legislative
enactment to this effect would create a more just statutory scheme for
this type of medical malpractice case.79
In its initial opinion, which was reversed by the supreme court, the court
of appeals underscored the positive impact that the continuing treatment
doctrine would have upon the physician-patient relationship.80 It is

71. Id. at 737, 580 S.E.2d at 601; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) (1985).
72. Pilzer, 260 Ga. App. at 736-37, 580 S.E.2d at 600-01; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (2003).
73. Pilzer, 260 Ga. App. at 738, 580 S.E.2d at 601.
74. Matthew E. Cook et al., Trial Practice& Procedure,54 MERCER L. REV. 545, 57 1-72
(2002).
75. 274 Ga. 845, 560 S.E.2d 690 (2002).
76. Id. at 848, 580 S.E.2d at 693.
77. Id.
78. 258 Ga. App. 821, 575 S.E.2d 648 (2002).
79. Id. at 824-25, 575 S.E.2d at 651.
80. See Williams v. Devell R. Young, M.D., P.C., 247 Ga. App. 337,341, 543 S.E.2d 737,
741 (2000), rev'd 274 Ga. 845, 560 S.E.2d 690 (2002).
"(1) [A] patient should properly place trust and confidence in his physician and
should be excused from challenging the quality of care being rendered to him until
that confidential relationship terminates; (2) to require a patient to bring suit
against his physician before treatment is terminated would conc eivably afford the
physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was terminated and
before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper result; and (3) the
treating physician is in the best position to identify and correct the malpractice."
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now up to the legislature to decide whether the doctrine should become
Georgia law."'
E. Statutes of Limitations, Service of Process, and Jurisdiction
The importance of exercising due diligence in perfecting service after
the expiration of the statute of limitation and documenting the steps
taken to do so cannot be overemphasized. 2 "Where the statute of
limitation accrues between the date of filing and the date of service,
whether or not it relates back (if the service is more than five days after
the filing) depends on the length of time and the diligence used by the
plaintiff."83 In Zeigler v. Hambrick," the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of an action for failing "to act diligently in serving
Hambrick 21 days after filing the renewal action."8 5 Although Zeigler
claimed the marshal's office was having trouble serving Hambrick
because of demands on the office, she "provided no evidence... that she
took any steps to ensure that her renewal action was served, such as by
making inquiries at the marshal's office or by requesting a special
process server." 6 The burden rests on the plaintiff to provide specific
details showing diligence in perfecting service, so Zeigler's failure to put
forth any evidence in that regard was fatal to her action despite the fact
that it took only twenty-one days to perfect service. 7
In an action against a nonresident motorist, the court of appeals held
8
that service may properly be made under either the Long Arm Statute

Id. at 341, 543 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting Vitner v. Miller, 208 Ga. App. 306, 308-09, 430
S.E.2d 671, 673 (Pope, C.J., concurring specially)) (citations omitted).
81. 258 Ga. App. at 825, 575 S.E.2d at 651.
82. Poteate v. Rally Mfg., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 34, 37, 579 S.E.2d 44, 47 (2003).
83. Id. at 36, 579 S.E.2d at 46 (quoting Bible v. Hughes, 146 Ga. App. 769, 770, 247
S.E.2d 584, 585 (1978)).
84. 257 Ga. App. 356, 571 S.E.2d 418 (2002).
85. Id. at 356, 571 S.E.2d at 419.
86. Id. at 357, 571 S.E.2d at 420.
87. Id.; see also Poteate, 260 Ga. App. at 37, 579 S.E.2d at 47 (holding trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence where
plaintiff waited three weeks from the date the waiver of service request was due before
forwarding the complaint to the sheriff for service on defendant); Williams v. Bragg, 260
Ga. App. 377, 378, 579 S.E.2d 800, 801 ("when a plaintiff is aware of a defendant's correct
address, he must also determine the correct county in which that address is found,
otherwise his actions... will support a summary judgment against him [when the statute
of limitation expires between the date the complaint is filed and the date of service].")
(quoting Cantin v. Justice, 224 Ga. App. 195, 196, 480 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (1997)).
88. Farrie v. McCall, 256 Ga. App. 446, 446, 568 S.E.2d 603, 603 (2002); O.C.G.A. § 910-94 (1966).
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or the Nonresident Motorists Act ("NRMA").89 In Farrie v. McCall,9
the trial court reluctantly dismissed an action that arose from the
nonresident's use of a motor vehicle within the state, despite the fact
that defendant was properly served under the Long Arm Statute, and it
found that the NRMA provided the exclusive means of service. 9' The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the NRMA "provides only an
alternative, not an exclusive, means of perfecting service on a nonresident motorist."92 The NRMA simply provides for a more lenient
method of service,93 and a plaintiff should not be denied access to court
for pursuing another, equally valid, method of service.
In Soley v. Dodson94 and Ward v. Dodson,95 plaintiffs originally
brought claims against Clarence Dodson, a sheriff's deputy, in his
individual capacity only. After voluntarily dismissing the suits,
plaintiffs attempted to use the renewal statute 96 to assert claims
against Dodson both individually and in his official capacity as deputy
sheriff.97 Because the claim against Dodson in his official capacity is
in reality a suit against the state, the claims against him in his official
capacity did not satisfy the requirement of substantial identity of the
The
parties between the original action and the renewal action."
renewal statute may not be used to suspend the statute of limitation as
to different defendants from those originally sued; thus, the claims
against Dodson in his official capacity were barred by the statute of
limitation.99
The purchasers of a home made from synthetic stucco brought a
negligence action against the home builder and a products liability

89. Farrie,256 Ga. App. at 446, 568 S.E.2d at 603; O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 (1967).
90. 256 Ga. App. 446, 568 S.E.2d 603 (2002).
91. Id. at 446, 568 S.E.2d at 603; O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94; O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1.
92. Farrie, 256 Ga. App. at 446, 568 S.E.2d at 603; see also King v. Barrios, 257 Ga.
App. 538, 538, 571 S.E.2d 531, 532 (2002) (holding that service on a nonresident motorist
is proper under either the Nonresident Motorist Act or the Long Arm Statute).
93. See Tate v. Hughes, 255 Ga. App. 511,512,565 S.E.2d 853,854 (2002) (holding that
service was properly perfected over nonresident motorist by serving Georgia Secretary of
State and sending a copy of the suit via certified mail; and, where the statute is complied
with, service is perfected irrespective of whether defendant actually received the notice).
94. 256 Ga. App. 770, 569 S.E.2d 870 (2002).
95. 256 Ga. App. 660, 569 S.E.2d 554 (2002).
96. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (1998).
97. Soley, 256 Ga. App. at 771,569 S.E.2d at 871-72; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 660, 569
S.E.2d at 555.
98. Soley, 256 Ga. App. at 772, 569 Ga. App. at 873; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 662, 569
S.E.2d at 556-57.
99. Soley, 256 Ga. App. at 773, 569 Ga. App. at 873; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 662, 569
S.E.2d at 557.
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action against the manufacturer of the stucco in Colormatch Exteriors,
Inc. v. Hickey.'
The supreme court held that the purchasers' right of
0 1
action accrued against the builders and that the statute of limitation
began to run on the date they purchased the property, rather than the
earlier date of substantial completion. 10 2 The statute of limitation
began to run against the stucco manufacturer, however, on the date of
10 3
substantial completion.
In Yukon Partners,Inc. v. Lodge Keeper Group, Inc.,' ° the court of
appeals recognized that "'[clontractual clauses providing advance consent
to the jurisdiction of a court which would not otherwise have personal
jurisdiction are valid and enforceable."" 0'
The court held that a
contract's mere recitation in the signature block that the agreement was
executed in Georgia was not the type of advance consent sufficient to
0 6
confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
F

Default
The holding of the court of appeals in Metropolitan Deluxe, Inc. v.
Bradsher'0 ' serves as a valuable lesson: extensions of time to file an
answer should always be filed with the court.'
In Bradsher the "two
opposing counsel [had] reached [an] agreement that either of them was
authorized to take extensions of time, with each authorized to sign the
other's name to such an extension .
,,.o9 To confirm an extension of
time to file defendant's answer, counsel telephoned plaintiff's counsel
and was informed that an extension would be granted, as authorized by
previous agreement. Based upon the agreement and the telephone
confirmation, defendant filed its answer on August 16, 1999, less than
fifteen days after the original due date, without ever filing a stipulation
extending the time to answer and without paying costs. 1

100. 275 Ga. 249, 569 S.E.2d 495 (2002).
101. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30(a) (2000).
102. Colormatch Exteriors,Inc., 275 Ga. at 252, 569 S.E.2d at 497.
103. Id. at 253, 569 S.E.2d at 499 (leaving for another day the determination of
whether the action accrues upon substantial completion of the entire building or of the
stucco installation only).
104. 258 Ga. App. 1, 572 S.E.2d 647 (2002).
105. Id. at 8, 572 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 Ga. App.
834, 835, 432 S.E.2d 256, 258-59 (1993)).
106. Id. at 7-8, 572 S.E.2d at 653.
107. 258 Ga. App. 265, 573 S.E.2d 504 (2002).
108. Id. at 267, 573 S.E.2d at 506-07.
109. Id. at 265-66, 573 S.E.2d at 506.
110. Id. at 266, 573 S.E.2d at 506.

20031

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

On August 23, defendant responded to interrogatories, and on
September 3, plaintiff's counsel expressed "dissatisfaction with the
answers to the interrogatories, which were unsworn and, in [plaintiff's]
counsel's opinion, unresponsive.""' Despite the gentlemen's agreement
that defendant had an extension of time to file an answer, plaintiff filed
a motion to strike defendant's answer and for entry of a default
judgment based on the fact that an extension had not been filed with the
court.112

The court upheld the entry of default by the trial court because a case
"automatically becomes in default by operation of law unless the time for
filing an answer has been extended as provided by law . . . [and] [an
agreement between the parties is insufficient; it must also be formalized
by filing it with the court.""' The court noted that the default could
have been opened as a matter of right by filing an answer and paying
costs within fifteen days of the deadline imposed by the Civil Practice
Act." 4 Although defendant did file its answer within that time limit,
it failed to pay costs in reliance upon the agreed extension." 5 This
failure 6to pay costs operated as a bar to the opening of default judgment. 1
G.

Damages

This year's survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions
addressing damages. In Sumitomo Corp. of America v. Deal,"' the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's reduction of a punitive
damages award in a nuisance and trespass case."'
Two Gwinnett
County homeowners sued a developer, alleging that a residential
development subjected the downstream landowners' property to siltation,
erosion, and flooding. The jury awarded approximately $175,000 in
compensatory damages and $42,000 in attorney fees to one homeowner.
To these amounts, the jury added $275,000 in punitive damages. The
trial court ruled that the punitive damages award was unconstitutional-

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 267, 573 S.E.2d at 506-07; see also Wilcher v. Smith, 256 Ga. App. 427, 42829, 568 S.E.2d 589, 591-92 (2002) (reversing trial court and holding case automatically in
default for filing answer after date imposed by Civil Practice Act because stipulation for
extension had not been filed).
114. Metro. Deluxe, Inc., 258 Ga. App. at 267, 573 S.E.2d at 507.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 256 Ga. App. 703, 569 S.E.2d 608 (2002).
118. Id. at 704, 569 S.E.2d at 611.
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ly excessive and reduced it to $100,000."9
The court of appeals
reversed, applying the factors from BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore.120 The court focused on the fact that the developer had notice of
the problems the homeowners experienced, yet did nothing to remedy
them.12 1 Also, the court examined the ratio of compensatory damages
to punitive damages, only 1 to 1.42, and noted that it fell well within the
range of acceptable awards.'2 2
In BDO Seidman, LLP v. Mindis Acquisition Corp.,2 ' the supreme
court defined the proper measure of damages in a negligent misrepresentation case. 2 4 The appropriate measure of damages is "[tihe difference
between the value of what [the plaintiff] has received in the transaction
and its purchase price or other value given for it [and] [plecuniary loss
suffered otherwise as a consequence of the plaintiff's reliance upon the
representation." 25 In adopting this measure of damages, the court
reasoned that negligent misrepresentation features a lesser degree of
culpability than fraudulent misrepresentation. 126 Damages for fraudulent misrepresentation are the "difference between the value of the thing
sold at the time of delivery and what would have been its value if the
representations made by the defendants had been true."'27
The court of appeals addressed another noteworthy damages issue in
Nash v. Allstate Insurance Co. 12 A traffic accident tragically left five
children without their mother and led to a dispute between the family
and a hospital over how the insurance funds should be divided. The
striking driver had $15,000 in liability insurance, and the deceased
mother had $10,000 in underinsured motorist ("UM") coverage after the
UM setoff was applied. Both insurers paid the proceeds into the registry
of the court. The trial court ruled that the hospital was entitled to over
$18,000 of the funds,
as it held a lien for providing care to the decedent
129
prior to her death.
Judge Barnes isolated the issue on appeal by determining that the
only claim that had been filed was the wrongful death claim filed by the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 704, 709, 569 S.E.2d at 611, 614.
Id. at 709, 569 S.E.2d at 614-15; 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Sumitomo Corp., 256 Ga. App. at 709-10, 569 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 710, 569 S.E.2d at 615.
276 Ga. 311, 578 S.E.2d 400 (2003).
Id. at 311-12, 578 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 312, 578 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 313, 578 S.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 311 n.1, 578 S.E.2d at 400 n.1.
256 Ga. App. 143, 567 S.E.2d 748 (2002).
Id. at 143-44, 567 S.E.2d at 748-49.
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children. 13' The mother's estate, which was responsible for the
hospital bills, had not asserted a claim seeking compensation for medical
bills. Under those facts, the wrongful death beneficiaries were entitled
to receive and keep the insurance proceeds because the lien did not
operate upon the wrongful death claim but, rather, only upon a claim for
recovery of the hospital bills. 13 ' Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered
all of the funds to be distributed to
132
the wrongful death beneficiaries.
In C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,13 3 the supreme

court made clear the principle that a judgment creditor may only enforce
a judgment against a judgment debtor. 3 1 In that case, plaintiff sued
C-Staff and an individual in federal district court in Florida. The federal
court dismissed the suit against the individual for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Plaintiff secured a $3.7 million judgment against C-Staff
and attempted to execute the judgment against the individual and two
other entities in federal court in Atlanta. The district court allowed the
action to enforce the judgment to proceed against all parties. The
Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court.3 5
The supreme court held that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-69 does not allow a
judgment creditor to implead
and hold liable persons who were not
136
parties to the judgment.

H.

Products Liability
Cases involving products liability resulted in several opinions that
impact trial practitioners. Perhaps the most significant products
liability case this survey period was Ontario Sewing Machine Co. v.
Smith. 13 7 In that case, a worker cut her hand using a machine
manufactured by the Ontario Sewing Machine Company. Prior to the
incident, the manufacturer had recalled the machine, directed the
worker's employer to stop using it, and provided the employer with the
opportunity to purchase a newer, more expensive machine. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, ruling that the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 145, 567 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 144, 567 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 146, 567 S.E.2d at 750.
275 Ga. 624, 571 S.E.2d 383 (2002).
Id. at 624, 571 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at 624-26, 571 S.E.2d at 383-85.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 (1987).
275 Ga. 683, 572 S.E.2d 533 (2002).
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employer's failure to stop using the machine after the recall was the sole
proximate cause of the worker's injury. 3 '
The court of appeals reversed, ruling as a matter of law that the
manufacturer's actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.'39 The court of appeals set forth the post sale duties that a
manufacturer-seller owes to discover defects and warn potential users of
those defects. 4 ° The supreme court affirmed with direction, holding
that the proper ruling was simply to leave the proximate cause issue to
4
the jury.1
'
The supreme court's opinion makes clear that issues
relating to a manufacturer's post sale duties to warn and recall are for
juries to decide, not judges.
Other recent products liability cases are instructive for all trial
practitioners. In Hunter v. Werner Co.,142 the court of appeals refused
to allow a party to benefit on the merits from abusing the discovery
process."
The case concerned the failure of a fiberglass ladder. In
discovery, defendant produced a technical manual dated from the year
1997, which warned of the dangers of sudden failure if fiberglass ladders
were not transported using special racks. At the summary judgment
hearing, defense counsel argued that the information contained in the
1997 manual could not be used to establish the manufacturer's prior
knowledge of the danger because the incident occurred in 1996. After
the hearing, plaintiffs' expert filed a supplemental affidavit stating that
he was familiar with an earlier version of the technical manual, dated
1995, that contained the same information about the need to transport
fiberglass ladders on special racks. The trial court refused to consider
the supplemental affidavit and granted summary judgment for

defendant.'
The court of appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to consider the supplemental affidavit. 4 5 The court focused
on the fact that defendant "manipulated the procedural rules by
withholding the pre-1997 manual and then bas[ed] an argument on the
absence of such a manual after it was too late to supplement the
record."146 The court refused to let stand a ruling that "rewards [a

138. Id. at 684, 572 S.E.2d at 534.
139. Id. at 684-85, 572 S.E.2d at 534-35; see Smith v. Ontario Sewing Mach. Co., 249
Ga. App. 364, 365, 548 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2001).
140. 275 Ga. at 685-86, 572 S.E.2d at 535.
141. Id. at 687, 572 S.E.2d at 536.
142. 258 Ga. App. 379, 574 S.E.2d 426 (2002).
143. Id. at 383, 574 S.E.2d at 430.
144. Id. at 381-82, 574 S.E.2d at 429-30.
145. Id. at 383, 574 S.E.2d at 430.
146. Id. at 382, 574 S.E.2d at 430.
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defendant] for what appears to be its failure to adhere to the discovery
rules." 47
The importance of making an objection to a jury charge in court, and
not just at the charge conference, was highlighted in Karoly v.Kawasaki
Motors Corp., U.S.A.'
In that case, plaintiff objected to a charge in
conference but failed to renew the objection on the record when given the
opportunity.4 9 The court of appeals ruled that plaintiff waived the
objection.150
I.

Defamation

During this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court clarified
Georgia's law defining a "limited-purpose public figure" in Mathis v.
Cannon.5 ' to determine the proper standard of liability for defamation
cases.152 The court was concerned with balancing the constitutional
right of free speech under the First Amendment against an individual's
right to protect his reputation.'53 In a suit for defamation, whether
the plaintiff is characterized as a private or public figure will, in most
cases, determine how the court will strike that balance."M The law
affords greater protection to private figures because they have not
"voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehoods . . . . " 5
"[I]n order for a 'public figure' to
recover in a suit for defamation, there must be proof by clear and
56
convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant,"
while those "who are 'private persons' must only prove that the
defendant acted with ordinary negligence." 57 Determining who is a
private or public figure, however, can be difficult, especially when the
plaintiff was an ordinary citizen who was unknown to the public before
becoming involved in a public controversy. The issue is whether the law
in such cases should elevate an ordinary person with limited public
exposure to public figure status.

147. Id. at 383, 574 S.E.2d at 430.
148. 259 Ga. App. 225, 576 S.E.2d 625 (2003).
149. Id. at 226, 576 S.E.2d at 626.

150. Id.
151. 276 Ga. 16, 573 S.E.2d 376 (2002).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 22-23, 573 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 16, 573 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 22, 573 S.E.2d at 381.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323 (1974).
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808,816,555 S.E.2d 175, 183

(2001).
157.

Id.
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In Mathis plaintiff filed a libel action against the defendant based on
defendant's publication of defamatory statements regarding plaintiff's
role as an independent contractor for Crisp County's Solid Waste
Management Authority and its unprofitable operation of the waste
recovery function. The trial court found that plaintiff was a private
figure and granted his motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability. The court of appeals affirmed and held that defendant's
statements constituted libel per se, 5 ' as plaintiff was a private figure,
and not a limited-purpose public figure, which would have required
application of the more stringent test for determining liability.'59
The Georgia Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari
to review whether the court of appeals erred in finding that plaintiff was
a private figure. 160 Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme
court held that plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure and that the
lower courts applied the wrong standard of liability in determining
fault.161
Under Georgia law, the supreme court held, "[w]hether a person is a
public figure is a question of law that requires the court to review the
nature and extent of the individual's participation in the specific
controversy that gave rise to the defamation."'62 The court reasoned
that "some persons may hold positions with such pervasive fame or
power that they are deemed public figures for all purposes, but more
often 'an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy and ... becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues.'"1 " Additionally, the court held that the facts
of each case must satisfy the three-prong test set forth in Atlanta
Under the Jewell analysis, "a court
Journal-Constitutionv. Jewell.'
'must' [1] isolate the public controversy, [2] examine the plaintiff's
involvement in the controversy, and [3] determine whether the alleged

158. Mathis, 276 Ga. at 16-17, 573 S.E.2d at 377. "At common law, libel was a strict
liability tort that did not require proof of falsity, fault, or actual damages. Since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the law of
defamation has undergone substantial changes." Id. at 20, 573 S.E.2d at 380 (internal
citations omitted). Today, according to the Restatement, there are four essential elements
in a cause of action for defamation: "(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the
plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant
amounting at least to negligence; and (4) special harm .... " Id.
159. Id. at 17, 573 S.E.2d at 377.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25, 573 S.E.2d at 383.
162. Id. at 22, 573 S.E.2d at 381.
163. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351) (internal citations omitted)).
164. Id. at 22-23, 573 S.E.2d at 381; 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (2001).
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defamation
was germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controver"165
sy.
In Mathis the supreme court concluded that plaintiff was a central
figure in the local public controversy concerning solid waste disposal and
that defendant's alleged defamatory remarks were germane to plaintiff's
involvement in the controversy. 6 ' Thus, plaintiff became a limitedpurpose public figure for proving defamation.'6 7
J.

Arbitration

In a surprising decision this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed a court of appeals decision which had vacated an arbitrator's
award because it was rendered in manifest disregard of the law.'
In
Progressive Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp.,169 the
court held, based on Green v. Hundle,"' that "an arbitration award
can be vacated in only one of four statutory ways,"' 7 ' and the statute
does not include "manifest disregard of the law"' as one of those
grounds.'7 3
Accordingly, O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13(b) provides four
exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and a party seeking
to vacate such an award must show one of the following:
"(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2)
Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) An overstepping
of the arbitrators of their authority ... ; or (4) A failure to follow the
procedure of this [Code], unless the party ... continued with the
arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection."174
The court reasoned that because the legislature set forth four
statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award, the court "should
not be so bold as to judicially mandate"'75 the inclusion of another;
namely manifest disregard of the law. 7 '
Because the "Georgia

165. Mathis, 276 Ga. at 23, 573 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Jewell, 251 Ga. at 817, 555
S.E.2d at 183).
166. Id. at 24-25, 573 S.E.2d at 382-83.
167. Id. at 25, 573 S.E.2d at 383.
168. Progressive Data Sys., Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp., 275 Ga. 420, 421, 568
S.E.2d 474, 475 (2002).
169. 275 Ga. 420, 568 S.E.2d 474 (2002).
170. 266 Ga. 592, 468 S.E.2d 350 (1996).
171. ProgressiveData Sys., 275 Ga. at 420, 568 S.E.2d at 475.
172. Id. at 421, 568 S.E.2d at 475.
173. Id. at 420-21, 568 S.E.2d at 475.
174. Id. at 420, 568 S.E.2d at 475 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) (1988)).
175. Id. at 421, 568 S.E.2d at 475.
176. Id.
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Arbitration Code is in derogation of the common law [it] must be strictly
construed."' 7 7
As Justice Carley points out in the dissenting opinion, the holding in
this case has the effect of "rendering judicial review [of such cases] a
meaningless exercise, [with the result that] an arbitrator is free to
ignore the law ....

,178

K. Sovereign Immunity
In Department of Transportationv. Montgomery Tank Lines, Inc.,179
the supreme court addressed the state's liability for contribution or

indemnity claims. 80 After paying a settlement for wrongful death, the
striking driver and his insurer brought actions for contribution and
indemnity against the Department of Transportation ("DOT"), alleging
that the DOT negligently designed and maintained the intersection
where the fatal collision occurred. 1 81 The DOT moved to dismiss,
contending "that the definition of 'loss' set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-2122(3) is a 'limitation' on the waiver of sovereign immunity, and
absolutely precludes any claims against the State for contribution and
indemnity.",8 2 The supreme court rejected the contention, holding
that the [Georgia Tort Claims Act] waives the State's sovereign
immunity for [contribution and indemnity] claims so long as the
activity of the State that is alleged to make it a tortfeasor, and thus
subject to a claim for contribution or indemnity, does not fall within
one of the exceptions 3to the waiver of sovereign immunity listed in

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24.

III.

CONCLUSION

This year's survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions. While
the survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have attempted
to provide material that will be useful for keeping practitioners updated
in the area of trial practice and procedure.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 420, 568 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 423, 568 S.E.2d at 476 (Carley, J., dissenting).
276 Ga. 105, 575 S.E.2d 487 (2003).
Id. at 105, 575 S.E.2d at 488.
Id.
Id. at 106, 575 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. at 105, 575 S.E.2d at 488.

